
The Agritech Gold Rush Cooled. The Companies Left Standing Learned to Get Their Boots Muddy
A wave of 'Uber for farmers' startups promised to disrupt Nigerian agriculture from a laptop. Most are gone. The survivors discovered an unglamorous truth: you cannot digitise a farm you have never walked.
A few years ago, agritech was the sector every Nigerian investor wanted a piece of. The logic was seductive and the slides were beautiful. Nigeria has tens of millions of smallholder farmers. They are underserved, unconnected to markets, starved of inputs and credit. Build an app to connect them — to buyers, to fertiliser, to a crowd of urban investors funding their harvests — and you would unlock one of the continent's great untapped markets. Money poured in.
Most of those companies no longer exist. The gold rush cooled fast, and the wreckage taught a lesson the survivors now repeat like a mantra: you cannot digitise a farm you have never walked.
The 'Uber for farmers' fantasy
The failed model had a recognisable shape. A team of smart, urban, English-speaking founders built an elegant platform from an office in Lagos. Farmers would list produce. Buyers would purchase. Investors would fund crop cycles for a return. Everything would flow through the app, frictionlessly, the way ride-hailing connected drivers and passengers.
Reality did not cooperate. The farmer in a village in Benue does not live in the app's assumptions. Connectivity is patchy. Trust in a faceless digital platform is low. Harvests fail — to weather, to pests, to bad luck — in ways a crowdfunding model priced for the average could not absorb. When crops underperformed, some platforms could not pay the urban investors they had promised returns, and the trust that took years to build evaporated in a season.
"We thought the hard part was building the software," a founder whose first company failed told me. "The hard part was the mud. The logistics. The trust. The fact that a farmer will believe a man he can shake hands with long before he believes a screen."
What the survivors do differently
The companies still standing share a trait the failed ones lacked: they got their boots muddy. They did not try to replace the physical texture of agriculture with an app. They built hybrid models where technology serves human relationships instead of trying to eliminate them.
- Field agents — real people, often from the community — who visit farms, build trust, and bridge the gap between the farmer and the platform.
- Deep logistics investment: aggregation points, storage, transport that actually moves produce before it spoils.
- Realistic risk models that price in the harvest failures the optimistic crowdfunders ignored.
Input finance beat crop crowdfunding
The most durable models also shifted what they sold. The crowdfunding pitch — urban investors bankrolling harvests for returns — proved fragile. What worked better was quieter: financing inputs. Get quality seed, fertiliser, and advice to a farmer on credit, tied to an eventual offtake agreement, and you improve yields in a way that benefits everyone and is far easier to underwrite than a speculative harvest bet.
This is less exciting. It does not make for a viral pitch deck. It is also a real business, closer to old-fashioned agricultural extension work than to a tech disruption story. The survivors made peace with that.
The deeper lesson for African tech
Agritech's boom and bust is a parable for the wider ecosystem. The sectors that resist pure software — agriculture, logistics, healthcare delivery — cannot be conquered from a laptop by founders who never leave the city. The physical world has friction, and the friction is where the real work lives.
The winners were not the ones with the slickest app. They were the ones willing to invest in the unglamorous middle: the agents, the trucks, the warehouses, the slow accumulation of trust in communities that had been promised much and delivered little.
I asked a surviving founder whether he still called his company an agritech startup. He laughed. "We call ourselves an agriculture company that uses technology," he said. "The order of those words matters. The ones who put 'tech' first are mostly gone. We put the farm first, and we're still here." The gold rush is over. What's left is the harder, muddier business of actually farming.
Audio version

Aminata Diallo

Léa Dubois-Kouassi
Discussion
(6)Partagez votre point de vue et découvrez les réactions des lecteurs.
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Log in to comment- Aïcha Chukwu15 novembre 2025
Sharp and necessary. Thank you.
- Ousmane Coulibaly11 janvier 2026
Great reporting — the details make it.
- Yaa Boateng2 mars 2026
More of this, please. Subscribed.
- Khadija Tazi1 avril 2026
Finally, a nuanced take on this. Bookmarked.
- Bintou Boateng4 juin 2026
Great reporting — the details make it.
- Leïla Bekele16 juin 2026
I disagree with the framing, but it made me think.
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